The International Monetary Fund was designed during World War II by men whose world view had been shaped by the Great War and the Great Depression. Their views on how the postwar international monetary system should function were also shaped by their economics training and their nationalities. After the IMF began functioning as an institution, its evolution was similarly driven by a combination of political events (Suez, African independence, the collapse of global Communism), economic events (the rising economic power of Europe, the middle East, and Asia), and trends and cycles in economic theory (the monetary approach to the balance of payments, new classical economics, the rise and fall of the Washington consensus). As they happened, these forces had effects that were perceived as adaptations to current events and new ideas within a fixed institutional structure and mandate. The cumulative effect of history on the institution has been rather more profound and requires a longer and larger perspective. 
III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.
Woodrow Wilson, Fourteen Points (1918) The International Monetary Fund was forged from failure.
When the heads of government of the great powers met in Paris at the end of 1918, they had before them a blueprint for restoring prosperity and world peace, in the form of U.S.
President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points. Six months later, they agreed on the terms of what would become known as the Treaty of Versailles, but key parts of the blueprint had been cast aside. Within a decade, prosperity was lost. In another decade, peace was gone as well. The most famous failure was Wilson's inability to convince the U.S. Senate to confirm the country's membership in the League of Nations. The most disastrous, however, was arguably the failure to lay the groundwork for economic cooperation among the world's great trading nations. Whether U.S. membership in the League would have slowed the slide toward war in the 1930s is debatable. The effect of the autarkic policies of the 1920s on the collapse of trade and output in the 1930s, however, is well established (Crucini and Kahn (1996) , Irwin (1998) The failure of Paris was only the first of a series of historical events and ideological evolutions to influence the design and work of the IMF and the postwar international monetary system. This paper surveys some of the key twentieth-century events and shifts in economic theory that had the greatest influence on the Fund, in order to draw some general conclusions about the force of history on the international monetary system that now prevails.
I. TEN EVENTS
The first three key events-the Paris peace conference, the Great Depression, and the Second World War-made the creation of a multilateral financial institution possible and largely determined the form it would take. Subsequent events caused the IMF to alter its practices in various ways to stay relevant in a changing world.
The Paris Peace Conference
Economics was far from being a high priority at the Paris peace conference. The borders of Europe had to be redrawn one by one, and that task alone took up most of the six months of high-level meetings. A means had to be found to pay the costs of the war and the costs of rebuilding, and solving that problem was about all the economics that any of the leaders had the patience for. They created the League of Nations, but its economic functions were poorly defined and never did gel into an effective role.
1 They created the International Labour
Organization, but its role was specialized and limited.
The conference's neglect of economics did not result from a failure to understand the importance of international trade for prosperity and thus for maintaining the peace. As the quotation at the head of this paper shows, Woodrow Wilson had made this relationship clear in his "fourteen points" speech to the U.S. Congress in January 1918. Instead, the neglect of economics occurred largely because the limitations of the invisible hand were not well understood. For a generation or more, the international gold standard had provided a measure of stability with little need for overt cooperation. The challenge seemed to be simply to avoid imposing barriers to trade or otherwise interfering with markets.
In the economic turmoil that followed the war, that passive approach was not nearly enough. Some countries remained on the gold standard, but others did not. Without clear guidance or any institutional check on behavior, competitive devaluations and punitive tariffs 1 For all its weaknesses, the League of Nations did undertake economic tasks including lending for financial stabilization. It also demonstrated the potential benefits of multilateral economic cooperation, at least to those who worked there. Its staff included a highly distinguished cadre of economists, several of whom later greatly influenced the IMF through their work (e.g., Tjalling Koopmans, Ragnar Nurkse, and Jan Tinbergen), by joining the staff (e.g., Jacques Polak and Marcus Fleming), or even becoming head of the institution (Per Jacobsson). For an analysis of the economic work of the League, see Pauly (1997) . For a brief memoir, see Polak (1994) , pp. xiv-xv.
became a common temptation for a quick fix to economic ills. Margaret MacMillan (2001) is surely right in arguing that the Versailles treaty cannot be held solely responsible for these and other ills of the twentieth century, but neither can it be absolved from blame.
What does this experience have to do with the IMF? A quarter century afterwards, it was very much on the minds of those who were drawing up the designs for the new institution. In the view of John Maynard Keynes (the head of the British delegation), the "contractionist pressure on world trade" brought on by the "special protective expedients which were developed between the two wars" resulted in large measure from futile efforts "to protect an unbalanced position of a country's overseas payments." Creation of an "international clearing union" would obviate the need for such "forced and undesired dodges." 2 Without the clearing union (which eventually morphed into the IMF), the expected persistent creditor position of the United States would depress world economic growth and drive the world back into protectionist policies, regardless of how quickly or well production and trade could be reconstructed after the war.
Harry Dexter White, the chief drafter of the IMF charter for the U.S. delegation, was equally impressed by the need to avoid the passive errors of Versailles. His initial plan noted that during "the last twenty years" (that is, throughout the interwar period), countries had often imposed protectionist policies because they lacked adequate gold reserves, and it warned that the same problems would arise and would constitute a major barrier to the 2 First draft of "Proposals for an International Currency (or Clearing) Union, " February 11, 1942; Horsefield (1969) Woods in 1944, they specified that one purpose of the institution was "to avoid competitive exchange depreciation."
It is important to note that for both Keynes and White, the motivating principle for creating the IMF was to engender postwar economic growth by establishing an institution that would prevent a relapse into autarky and protectionism, not just to avoid a recurrence of the Depression. The impetus was less the Depression than the necessity of rebuilding and engendering economic growth after the war.
The Great Depression
Although the Great Depression may not have been the "defining moment" for the international monetary system (as argued by Bordo and Eichengreen (1998) ), it was certainly an important influence on the initial design of the IMF. The Depression amplified the negative consequences of Versailles, as an implosion of international trade interacted with domestic policy errors to deflate both output and prices around the world. It severely tested the confidence of analysts and voters in the efficacy of free markets and strengthened belief in an activist role for the public sector in economic life. It thus became easier and more natural to start discussions on a postwar framework from the assumption that an intergovernmental agency with substantive powers would be beneficial and even essential for the international financial system.
The combined effects of Versailles (the absence of a stabilizing system in international finance) and the Depression were an important influence on the mandate of the IMF adopted at Bretton Woods in 1944. Article I of the Articles of Agreement, which sets out the purposes of the Fund, includes the objective of using IMF lending to provide member countries "with opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive of national or international prosperity." Article IV set out a system for achieving that purpose by establishing a system of fixed but adjustable exchange rates through agreements to be reached under the auspices of the Fund. U.S. Treasury staff made the case for such a system by evoking the specter of what had occurred throughout the interwar period: "Long before the war, the necessary monetary and financial basis for international prosperity had been weakened by competitive currency depreciation, by exchange restriction, by multiple currency devices," and the like. 4 The new institution would obviate the need for such unilateral and destructive actions.
World War II
The third major historical influence on the IMF was the Second World War, which provided both the impetus and the context for reforming the international system. When the United States entered the war in response to the bombing of Pearl Harbor in December 1941, Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, Jr., put Harry White in charge of international economic and financial policy and asked him to come up with a plan for remaking the system once the war was over. As it happened, White had already sketched out a rough plan for an international stabilization fund, and he was able to produce a first draft within a couple of months. On the other side of the Atlantic, Keynes was developing a plan for an international clearing union to be run jointly by Britain and the United States as "founder-States." 5 Though less overtly multilateral than White's scheme, and based on the British overdraft system rather than on White's rather complicated proposal for currency swaps (Boughton (2002 and 2003b) ), Keynes's clearing union was similar in its essence to White's stabilization fund.
Over the next two years of discussion and negotiation, the two plans would meld into a draft for the IMF charter.
The IMF was created in the midst of the war, at the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, which convened 44 country delegations at Bretton Woods in July 1944. Keynes had tried to limit the involvement of countries other than Britain and the United States, fearing that a "great monkey house" would result if all of the wartime allies were invited. White, however, insisted on a multilateral conference, partly because he seems to have sensed that the project would otherwise fail and partly because he doubtless wanted to neutralize the force of Keynes's intellect and personality.
The importance of Bretton Woods as a wartime event was that it took advantage of a window of opportunity to create a multilateral financial system. Both before and after the war, there was too much suspicion and national self-interest for such a sweeping agreement to be possible. Even in 1945, when the U.S. Congress and the U.K. Parliament were to ratify the Articles of Agreement, passage was far from easy (Gardner (1956) 
The Rise of Multiple Economic Centers
Once the war was over and the world economy-and world trade-began to recover, U.S. economic hegemony was gradually eroded. The first to rise from the ashes was western
Europe. Through a combination of national drive, international support-from the U.S.
Marshall Plan, the World Bank, and eventually the IMF-, and a home-grown Articles and creating Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) as a supplement to existing reserve assets, but that action was too limited to deal with the underlying problem of differential pressures. As a result, even before the first oil shock in 1973, the original Bretton Woods system of fixed but adjustable exchange rates had become unviable. A second amendment, adopted in 1978, acknowledged that exchange rates among key currencies were likely to float or at least be allowed to adjust more frequently than the old system could have handled.
The Cold War
Harry The obvious effect of the Cold War on the IMF was this limitation on membership. In the terminology of the period, it included the first world and much of the third, but the second was missing from the table. The IMF became largely a capitalist club that helped stabilize market-oriented economies. 8 The more subtle and difficult question concerns the effect on the staff and its analytical work. The bulk of IMF analysis has always been mainstream and centrist, viewed from the perspective of the dominant strain of Anglo-Saxon economics. The leading universities of North America, the United Kingdom, and Australia have been the main training grounds for much of its professional staff. Martha Finnemore, a political scientist who has studied a number of large organizations, has even claimed that the Pentagon displays more intellectual diversity than the IMF.
9
Would this centrist dominance have been weaker, with a broader range of views on economic policy being represented (perhaps at some cost of efficiency and effectiveness), if the Fund's membership had been universal from the outset? That seems unlikely. The shift to universal membership in the 1990s and the corresponding geographic broadening of the staff 10 -in Finnemore's terminology, an increase in "passport diversity"-have so far had little analytical impact. Moreover, the influence of Latin American economic thoughtexemplified by the dependencia theories of Raúl Prebisch (1971) and others at the UN Economic Commission on Latin America 11 -was never strong in the IMF despite the presence of large numbers of economists from the region on the Fund staff from the outset.
Analytical diversity and internal dissent have been more prominent in the World Bank (with the same membership) than in the IMF, albeit less so than in the nearly universal United Nations secretariat. The influence of mainstream western thinking at the IMF-an influence that the staff itself would regard with some justification as reflecting best practices in the economics profession-is a more deeply seated phenomenon than can be explained by Cold War politics.
African Independence
Only three of the IMF's 40 original members were in Africa: Egypt, Ethiopia, and South Africa. Of those, one was more closely affined to the Middle East, and one was minority 12 They comprised nearly a third of the member countries, though their average small size and mostly low incomes meant that they controlled less than 9 percent of the voting power and held only three of the 22 seats on the Executive Board.
13
The emergence of Africa as a continent of independent nations had a major effect on the size and diversity of the IMF, and it required a substantial intensification of the Fund's involvement with and oversight of its borrowers. Most of these countries, especially in subSaharan Africa, had and still have very low per capita incomes and are among the least economically developed countries in the world. Their economic problems tend to be structural even more than macroeconomic; rooted in the need for improvements in education, health, infrastructure, and governance rather than finance; and more deeply ingrained and persistent than in other regions. When the Fund began providing financial assistance to large numbers of low-income countries in the 1970s, it had to find ways to subsidize its lending, coordinate its assistance with other official agencies, and develop more extensive and structural policy-reform conditions on its lending. In addition, the Fund sharply increased and broadened its provision of technical assistance to member countries, thereby expanding its work further beyond its original boundaries.
Lending to low-income countries also raised the riskiness of the IMF's portfolio of sovereign claims. By the mid-1980s, several African countries had fallen into protracted 13 These figures include all countries on the African continent or on its offshore islands. In addition to two Executive Directors from sub-Saharan Africa, a group of countries from the Middle East and North Africa has-except for two years in the mid-1970s-been represented by an Executive Director from Egypt or Libya.
arrears on their borrowings from the Fund, which forced the institution to further reexamine its conditionality as well as its finances. Several countries with protracted arrears-mostly in Africa-have been subject to "remedial" measures leading up to suspension of voting rights.
The IMF now lends to low-income countries primarily through a separately funded subsidized window, the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, and it coordinates that assistance with the World Bank. To qualify for those loans, countries must develop their own strategies for generating economic growth and reducing poverty. The IMF still emphasizes the need for countries to maintain sound macroeconomic policies, but that traditional focus is only the starting point for most of its work in Africa.
The Vietnam War
The decline, but its catalytic role was certainly substantial (James (1996) , Chapter 8).
Globalization of Financial Markets
Private-sector financial flows were of limited scope and importance when the IMF was founded. Trade flows were financed largely by trade credits, and cross-border portfolio flows were considered by most economists to be as much a potential destabilizing nuisance as a potential source of investment capital. Keynes and White therefore agreed that the IMF should be given the power to restrict capital flows in situations where they seemed to be destabilizing. Article VI of the IMF charter prohibited member countries from borrowing from the Fund "to meet a large or sustained outflow of capital," and it empowered the IMF to "request a member to exercise controls to prevent such use" and to declare the member ineligible to use the Fund's resources if it failed to comply. More generally, it recognized countries' right to impose capital controls as long as the controls did not restrict payments for transactions on the current account.
The range and importance of capital flows began to increase in the 1950s as European countries gradually reestablished convertibility. The first big increase, however, came in the 1970s, with the emergence of the Eurodollar and other offshore financial markets. It was driven further by the accumulation of "petrodollars" by oil exporting countries in the 1970s and the recycling of those assets to oil-importing sovereign borrowers through large international banks. By the 1990s, cross-border flows had become an essential source of finance for both industrial and emerging-market economies around the world, and the structure of international financial markets had become so complex that their effective size could no longer be measured, much less controlled.
Largely in an implicit recognition of these developments, the IMF has never invoked the provisions of Article VI enabling it to encourage the imposition of capital controls. Nor has the prohibition on lending to finance a large or sustained capital outflow ever prevented the Fund from acting, simply because it can always be argued that an unchecked capital outflow will eventually cause problems for the current account. That justification was first made in 1956, when the United Kingdom borrowed to stop a speculative attack on the pound sterling in the wake of the Suez crisis (Boughton (2001b) ), and it has been taken for granted ever since.
A second effect of financial globalization was that IMF financing became quantitatively marginalized for many potential borrowers. In the early days of the IMF, countries facing a financing gap in their balance of payments could often close it solely by borrowing from the Fund. By the 1980s, the object was more often to "catalyze" other capital inflows by borrowing relatively small amounts from the Fund in support of an agreed package of policy reforms and thereby hoping to convince other creditors that the country was a good prospect.
What mattered was not so much the quantity of money as the quality of the reforms.
Globalization thus fundamentally altered the relationship between the IMF and its borrowing members and between the IMF and other official and private creditors.
A third effect was to weaken the "credit union" character of the IMF as a membership institution. The original idea was that most countries would probably undergo periods as creditors and other periods as debtors. In the 1950s and 1960s, most of the large industrial countries fit that description. Of the seven largest economies, only Germany and the United
States consistently maintained creditor positions in the Fund. By the 1980s, however, the more advanced economies all were able to finance their external payments with private flows, and the membership of the IMF became divided into persistent creditor and debtor groups. The presumed commonality of interests among members was correspondingly diminished.
The International Debt Crisis
In Argentina, Brazil, and Chile were also in trouble, and the crisis was continuing to spread. Not until 1990, when world interest rates were settling down and the bank debts of the most heavily indebted developing countries were being replaced by Brady Bonds, would it be possible to declare the crisis over (Boughton (2001a) , Part II).
The debt crisis had a transforming impact on the IMF, catapulting it into the role of international crisis manager. Previous international crises-Suez in 1956, the breakdown of the official gold market in 1968, the oil shocks of the 1970s-had intensified the demand for IMF lending without fundamentally changing the way the IMF worked (Boughton (2000) ).
The 1982 crisis was different because the range and diversity of creditors involved made it unlikely that it could be resolved without the active involvement of an outside agent. The 
II. TEN IDEAS
While these events were shaping the IMF and in some cases forcing it to adapt to changing circumstances, economic theories were also evolving. Events and ideas often overlapped in their effects on the IMF and the international monetary system. 
Keynesian Macroeconomics
The IMF was conceived essentially as a Keynesian institution. This linkage should not be surprising, since Keynes was one of its founding fathers and the other (White) was a New
Deal economist who had championed the use of countercyclical monetary and fiscal policy as early as 1932 (Laidler and Sandilands (2002) ). The U.S. Treasury's case for creating the Fund stressed that the goal was to use and coordinate macroeconomic policies to prevent recessions and unemployment. "Only through international cooperation," they wrote, "will it be possible for countries successfully to apply measures directed toward attaining and maintaining a high level of employment and real income which must be the primary objective of economic policy." 14 These objectives were accordingly included in Article I, along with world economic growth ("development of the productive resources of all members") and avoidance of contractionary policies ("measures destructive of national or international prosperity").
The Fund staff made a major contribution to Keynesian macroeconomics in the late 1940s by developing the "absorption approach" to the balance of payments. Earlier analyses of the effect of a currency devaluation on the balance of trade stressed the "elasticities" or "expenditure switching" channel, through which a devaluation would make imports relatively more expensive and thus less in demand. In response to a devaluation of the This argument is based on a fundamental misconception of both Keynesian macroeconomics and IMF policy advice (Rogoff (2003) ). Countries that are unable to finance their external payments position on affordable terms, regardless of whether the initial source of the difficulty was a fiscal excess, an adverse terms of trade shock, or other developments, have to restore balance if they are to maintain full employment and growth. Keynes himself acknowledged in his General Theory (1936, p. 332 ) that the early stages of Roosevelt's New Deal, involving "curtailment of current output" through a reduction in unwanted inventories,
were "a phase which had to be endured. ... Only when it had been completed was the way prepared for substantial recovery."
15 See Polak (1948) and Alexander (1952) . The evolution of the absorption approach at the IMF is described more fully in de Vries (1987), pp. 16-19. Polak's contribution is described more fully in Frenkel and others (1991) , pp. 8-10.
The IMF, or any institution acting in real time to solve economic crises, often gets the required extent of adjustment wrong, and a case could be made that the Fund is biased on the side of caution (IEO (2003)). But that is different from asserting that it has the basic idea wrong. 
The Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments

Monetarism
The emergence of monetarism as a theory of aggregate demand (Friedman (1956 ), Brunner (1968 ) probably had less impact on the IMF than on the economics profession at large, and its influence was felt primarily in efforts made to examine and ultimately to reject it. In its crudest form (as contrasted with the more nuanced versions discussed in Gordon (1974)), the theory stated that the velocity of money was so stable that policy-induced changes in the supply of money would be reliably transmitted to changes in the price level, and that other influences on aggregate prices could be safely ignored. To economists steeped in an open-economy Keynesian tradition and accustomed to looking for patterns in crosscountry analyses, none of the elements of this syllogism seemed particularly persuasive.
Studies at the IMF tended to show that for most countries one could estimate a reasonably stable equation linking some measure of the money stock to prices in a form that was reasonably consistent with the theoretical construct of a demand function. Those equations, however, were functions of interest rates and other variables subject to influences other than monetary policy, and they displayed few properties that were consistent across countries or over time (e.g., Argy (1970) , Crockett and Evans (1980), and Boughton (1991) ). Similarly, the supply of money could not be assumed to be completely policy-controlled, particularly when the exchange rate was fixed or actively managed.
Despite these limitations and misgivings, monetarist theory had a forceful pull when (Schaechter, Stone, and Zelmer (2000) ).
The spread of inflation targeting as a monetary policy strategy provided new opportunities and challenges for the IMF. The opportunity was to try to use this strategy to encourage these and other countries to adopt more stable monetary policies. In general, the Fund did so, though with the caveat that the right conditions-well developed financial markets, sound fiscal policies, and an overall stable macroeconomic environment-should be in place before inflation targeting can be expected to contribute to economic performance.
Since 1995, IMF staff have published some two dozen working papers on inflation targeting, most of which focus to some extent on establishing the preconditions for successful implementation either generally or in specific countries.
The operational challenge for the Fund has been to adapt program design and conditionality when borrowing countries are targeting inflation rather than conventional monetary policy instruments. In these cases, variables that are usually the subject of IMF policy conditions, particularly floors on net international reserves and ceilings on domestic credit expansion, are not separately controllable by the central bank. Setting conditions on the inflation rate itself would weaken the Fund's ability to monitor policy implementation because of the lag between policy changes and inflation effects (Blejer and others (2002) ).
To date, the Fund has tried to steer a middle course, adhering to its conventional instruments while monitoring inflation and other indicators as a further check on implementation and consistency.
The Case for Floating Exchange Rates
Long before the collapse of the par value system in 1973, economists had begun to examine whether exchange rates had to be fixed in order to contribute to economic stability and the growth of international trade. Until the early 1950s, "convertibility" was generally interpreted to mean that a currency could be converted into something else (often, gold) at a fixed price. Milton Friedman (1953 ), Gottfried Haberler (1954 , Lutz (1954) , and James Meade (1955) challenged that view and established an intellectual position that floating and convertibility could be consistent and that floating need not be destabilizing. Friedman's argument was directed specifically at the Bretton Woods par value system, which he argued was "ill suited to current ... conditions." Floating, in his view, was "absolutely essential for ... unrestricted multilateral trade."
The case for floating took a long time to influence thinking in the IMF. As long as the major industrial countries were committed to maintaining a system of fixed rates anchored on a gold-convertible U.S. dollar, the priority in the Fund was to make that system work as well as possible. Canada's decision in 1950 to float its currency was viewed with concern in the Fund as a possible threat to systemic stability (Horsefield (1969), Vol. I, pp. 272-75) . Even after the fixed-rate system collapsed, the committee of IMF Governors known as the Committee of Twenty spent two futile years trying to formulate a viable replacement system.
Only when that effort failed did interest shift toward examining how a stable system could emerge in a world without stable exchange rates. That led to the idea of IMF surveillance over countries' exchange rate policies, exercised through regular consultations and supplemented by periodic World Economic Outlook (WEO) reports. From that point on, the Fund took an eclectic case-by-case view on what constituted an appropriate exchange rate regime for any particular country (Mussa and others (2000) , Appendix IV). Along with the rest of the economics profession, the Fund staff continued to debate and reflect on whether any general principles could be applied in practice (Rogoff and others (2004) ).
Supply-Side Macroeconomics
The term supply-side economics has taken on a variety of meanings over the past quarter-century. In the 1970s, it referred to efforts to model the supply side of the economy as an adjunct to Keynesian analysis of the demand side. That line of reasoning, exemplified by the stagflation model developed by Michael Bruno and Jeffrey Sachs (1981, 1985) , was influential in the Fund and was reflected in the WEO and other studies as well as in the Fund's policy advice and conditionality. In the 1980s, the term was hijacked by tax-cut advocates who argued either that lowering tax rates would raise tax revenues by stimulating economic activity (Canto, Joines, and Laffer (1983) ) or that a shift from taxes to deficit financing would have no real effects ("Ricardian equivalence"; Barro (1974) ). By the 1990s, it had branched out to encompass advocates of low interest rates and monetary expansion, on the grounds that inflation would be held in check by productivity growth stimulated by easy money (e.g., Kemp (2001) ). These radical views never took hold in the Fund.
New Classical Economics
The theoretical development that probably had the biggest post-Keynes impact on the IMF was the reformulation of the micro foundations of macroeconomics in the 1970s and early 1980s. Rational expectations theory seemed to undermine the basis for countercyclical demand management policy. In its place came the case for stable policies and nominal anchors to underpin stable expectations. The economics of information was being independently developed around the same time, and that work would eventually lead to a synthesis in which the countercyclical effects of monetary and fiscal policies could be more clearly understood. In the meantime, the new classical concepts held the floor.
The Fund did not develop a doctrine on this issue, but its surveillance activities (both in the WEO and in consultations with individual countries) did shift toward laying greater stress on the desirability of a medium-term policy framework and toward skepticism about the efficacy of countercyclical policies. In the early 1980s, it was still possible for the staff working on Japan to advise the government to take expansionary fiscal action to counter a slowdown, while the staff working on the United States were endorsing the eschewal of such policies by the Reagan administration (Boughton (2001a) , Chapter 3). The clearest example of the shift in thinking, however, was in the annual consultations with Germany, where the staff gradually abandoned the view that persistently high unemployment was due to weak demand and increasingly focused on rigid labor markets and other supply-side issues as the source of the problem (Ibid.).
The Silent Revolution
Until the late 1980s, state socialism-government control over economic activity-had a dominant role in driving economic development in many parts of the developing world, in economies as diverse as India, Mexico, and Tanzania 
Behavioral Economics and the New Political Economy
The lifeblood of the IMF is its ability to persuade policy makers to take appropriate actions to improve economic outcomes. Throughout the history of the Fund, the staff has relied primarily on the power of its economic analysis to bring about welfare-enhancing policy changes. Whether the context is the annual consultation with each member country, the global analysis presented in periodic publications such as the World Economic Outlook, or the negotiation of policy reforms to be supported by financial assistance from the Fund, the emphasis has always been on the logic of macroeconomic analysis contained in the models and paradigms discussed above. In recent years, however, the Fund has also paid increasing attention to the lessons from a broader range of related disciplines in an effort to improve its success at persuading country authorities to accept and implement its advice.
Several theoretical developments have helped impel this evolution in approach. One strand is what George Akerlof (2001) has termed "behavioral macroeconomics," which sets out to explain a variety of market imperfections and suboptimal policy regimes based on fundamental principles of human behavior. Another is the emergence of a variety of models 16 The quotations are from the IMF Annual Report: 1996, pp. 202-203; 1997, p. 211; and 1999, p. 187. An explicit recognition of the importance of "the soundness of financial systems ... [and] the need for improved prudential supervision" is in the first of those cited reports.
based on a synthesis of economics and political sciences, dubbed the political economy of macroeconomics (Drazen (2000) ). Developments in game theory and experimental economics have further informed these analyses. Relevant applications include principalagent and public-choice models, both of which provide insights on the circumstances under which Fund policy advice might or might not lead to improvements in global welfare.
The clearest example of the influence of this new political economy on the work of the IMF was the adoption of new conditionality guidelines in 2002. The previous guidelines, adopted in 1979, set limits on the policy changes that the Fund could specify as conditions for its lending to a member country. The new guidelines updated those limits so as to better focus and streamline conditionality, but it also broke new ground by specifying the processes that should guide the staff in its discussions with national authorities and other major stakeholders. The explicit goal of this extension was to promote national ownership of policy reforms and increase the prospects that those reforms could and would be carried out successfully. Much of the staff analysis that underpinned the exercise that led to the new guidelines was based on political economy models (see Mayer and Mourmouras (2002) and Boughton and Mourmouras (2004) ).
III. CONCLUSIONS: HOW HAS HISTORY SHAPED THE IMF?
The IMF was created at a particular time in world history-during the Second World War-and was given a structure and mandate that reflected that time and those circumstances. The institution has changed greatly in the six decades since Bretton Woods.
Much of the volume of its lending has become crisis-driven, and the Fund's involvement in crisis prevention and resolution has correspondingly intensified. It has to a large extent become divided into groups of creditor and debtor countries whose membership changes slowly over long periods of time. Its membership is much larger, more diverse, and nearly universal, and its responsibilities in global governance have correspondingly increased. The breadth of its involvement in policymaking in member countries, especially borrowing countries, has vastly increased, though a concerted effort has been made in recent years to circumscribe that role.
If the events and ideas chronicled here had not affected the IMF along these lines, the institution would have become marginalized and even irrelevant. The motivation for the evolution of the IMF has been the need to meet shifts in demand-shifts in world economic and political conditions-not to satisfy forces from within seeking to reinvent the institution so as to hang onto a role once the original purpose had faded away. The challenge for the IMF has always been to hold on to its vital center (the original narrow mandate to promote orderly payments adjustment and global financial stability) while adapting its activities to new circumstances and new ideas. Meeting that challenge became increasingly difficult in the 1970s and 1980s, when the advent of generalized currency floating, financial globalization, the need for multilateral crisis management, and financial demands from lowincome countries all pressed new functions and responsibilities onto the Fund. By the 1990s, when the Fund had to deal with all of those issues plus the need for rapid structural reforms in formerly centrally planned economies-including Russia, with its great geopolitical importance-"mission creep" became inevitable.
